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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

ples, reached the opposite conclusion. Hopefully, its holding will
not be followed in the future.
ARTICLE

52-

ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS

CPLR 5201: Seiderjurisdiction asserted in case involving both resident
and nonresident plaintiffs.
That a nonresident's insurance policy issued by an insurer
doing business in New York may be attached by a New York
plaintiff for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction in a suit based on
an out-of-state accident was first recognized by the Court of Appeals in Seider v. Roth. 88 It is now well established as the law of New
York. 8 9 Nevertheless, Seider attachment continues to receive criticism from commentators9" and to create problems for courts
88 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). In Seider, a New York
resident used CPLR 5201 and CPLR 6202 to attach an out-of-state defendant's automobile
insurance policy, claiming that the insurer, who was doing business in New York, had an
obligation to defend and indemnify the defendant, and that this obligation was an attachable
debt.
" The constitutionality of Seider was upheld in Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106
(2d Cir. 1968), affid en bane, 410 F.2d 117, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969). Much of the
criticism of Seider stressed the lack of due process inherent in a suit which compels the
defendant-insured, as well as his insurer, to litigate in a forum which was not connected with
the underlying accident, thereby going beyond the jurisdictional "minimum contacts" test
laid down by the Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945). Even though the Seider attachment of an insurance policy is a quasi-in-rem action,
and the minimum contacts theory is normally associated with in personam jurisdiction, it is
not improper to assess jurisdiction over an intangible res in terms of fairness and contacts
with the state. Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957) (en banc),
cert. denied, 357 U.S. 569 (1958) (jurisdiction over a chose in action based upon a totality of
the contacts). Using such an analysis, the majorities in Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d
305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967), rehearingdenied, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d
319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968), and Minichiello considered the New York residency of the
injured plaintiff and the presence of the insurer within New York sufficient contacts with
this State to allow quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. Furthermore, these courts reasoned that neither
the insured nor the insurer are substantially prejudiced by a New York adjudication since
the insurer is already present in the State, has contracted to defend the insured anywhere at
anytime, and the insured will be reimbursed for expenses incurred in cooperation with the
defense. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d at 118-19; Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d at
311, 234 N.E.2d at 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
As long as the Supreme Court decision in Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905), remains
valid law, it is unlikely that Seider will be overturned on constitutional grounds. Harris
allowed the garnishment of a debt wherever the debtor may be found. Moreover, the
Supreme Court has had opportunities to declare Seider unconstitutional, but has declined to
grant certiorari in every instance. See, e.g., Victor v. Lyon Associates Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 695, 234
N.E.2d 459, 287 N.Y.S.2d 424 (1967), appeal dismissedfor want of a substantialfederalquestion,
393 U.S. 7 (1968). For further discussion of the constitutionality of Seider, see Note, Seider v.
Roth: The Constitutional Phase, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 58 (1968).
DoSee, e.g., 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 5201, commentary at 16-76, (Supp. 1975); Note,
Jurisdiction in New York. A Proposed Reform, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1412 (1969); Comment,
Garnishment of Intangibles: Contingent Obligations and the Interstate Corporation, 67 COLUM. L.
REv. 550 (1967); Note, Attachment of Liability Insurance Policies, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 1108
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struggling with the sometimes harsh effects of the doctrine. 91 To
counteract some of this criticism and remedy some of the difficulties created by Seider, courts have increasingly relied on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 92 This doctrine grants courts discretion to decline the exercise of jurisdiction where it appears that the
present forum is only minimally connected with the controversy or
that the plaintiff has engaged in forum shopping or harassment of
the defendant in choosing an inconvenient forum. 93 Of course,
exercise of this discretion is conditioned upon a finding by the
court that there exists another forum in which the action can be
brought 94 and that transfer of the action would be in the interest of
95
justice and fairness.
(1968); Comment, Jurisdiction-Quasi

In Rem: Seider v. Roth to Turner v. Evers -

Wrong

Means to the Right End, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 504 (1974).
91 Seider has created serious questions concerning personal jurisdiction over the insured,

Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d
305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967), rehearingdenied, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d
319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968); choice of law, Tjepkema v. Kenney, 31 App. Div. 2d 908, 298
N.Y.S.2d 175 (1st Dep't) (mem.), appeal dismissed, 24 N.Y.2d 942, 250 N.E.2d 68, 302
N.Y.S.2d 580 (1969), discussed in 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 5201, commentary at 34-35 (Supp.
1975); res judicata and collateral estoppel, Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, aff'd en
banc, 410 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969); application of Seider
doctrine to other than automobile insurers, Flemming v. Williams, 30 App. Div. 2d 834, 293
N.Y.S.2d 45 (2d Dep't 1968) (mem.).
Seider has met with little success in other jurisdictions considering its adoption. Compare
Sykes v. Beal, 392 F. Supp. 1089 (D. Conn. 1975); Javorek v. Superior Ct., 17 Cal. 3d 629,
552 P.2d 728, 131 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1976); Kirchman v. Mikula, 258 So. 2d 701 (La. App.
1972); State ex rel. Government Emps.' Ins. Co. v. Lasky, 454 S.W.2d 942 (Mo. App. 1970);
Jardine v. Donnelly, 413 Pa. 474, 198 A.2d 513 (1964); De Rentiis v. Lewis, 106 R.I. 240, 258
A.2d 464 (1969); Howard v. Allen, 254 S.C. 455, 176 S.E.2d 127 (1970), and Housley v.
Anaconda Co., 19 Utah 2d 124, 427 P.2d 390 (1967) (rejecting Seider) with Rintala v.
Shoemaker, 362 F. Supp. 1044 (D. Minn. 1973) (adopting Seider), and Forbes v. Boynton,
113 N.H. 617, 313 A.2d 129 (1973) (retaliatory adoption of Seider).
92 The doctrine originated in the courts of England and Scotland during the 19th
century. Its spread to this country was considerably aided by the publication of an oft-cited
law review article by Paxton Blair. Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in AngloAmerican Law, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1929) [hereinafter cited as Blair]. Blair discusses several
of the early cases wherein jurisdiction, once having been properly obtained through attachment, transient service of process, or joinder of questionably necessary parties, was subsequently declined owing to unavailability of witnesses or evidence, unfairness, involvement of
difficult questions of foreign law, or obvious harassment of the defendant. Id. at 20-30. See
327.01-.03.
generally 1 WK&M
93 Blair, supra note 92. Aforum non conveniens objection should be raised at the earliest
reasonable opportunity to avoid possible prejudice to the plaintiff and to demonstrate the
defendant's good faith. Otherwise it may be considered waived. Neumeier v. Kuehner, 43
App. Div. 2d 109, 349 N.Y.S.2d 866 (4th Dep't 1973); Lemonis v. Prudential Grace Lines,
Inc., 176 N.Y.L.J. 3, July 6, 1976, at 7, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County). See generally Barrett,
The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 380, 380-89 (1947); Morley, Forum
Non Conveniens: Restraining Long-Arm Jurisdiction, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 24, 24-26 (1973);
Developments in the Law - State-CourtJurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REv. 909, 1009-11 (1960).
94 See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), wherein the Supreme Court
stated that when "the doctrine of forum non conveniens comes into play, it presupposes at
least two forums in which the defendant is amenable to process; the doctrine furnishes
criteria for choice between them." Id. at 506-07. In Gulf, a Virginia plaintiff-warehouseman
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Recently, in Menefee v. Floyd & Beasley TransportationCo., 96 the
Supreme Court, Nassau County, was confronted with a case
wherein multiple plaintiffs, including both residents and nonresidents of New York, sought to invoke quasi-in-rem jurisdiction by
effecting a Seider attachment of a nonresident defendant's insurance policy. The action arose out of an Alabama automobile accident in which five persons were killed when the car in which they
were riding collided with defendant's bus. On the date of the
accident, two of the decedents were New York residents. The
remaining three passengers were residents of Rhode Island. Of the
three defendants, two were residents of Alabama and a third, who
failed to appear in court, was a resident of New York.97 After
careful balancing of the competing considerations, Justice Berman
held that the court had jurisdiction over all the plaintiffs' claims
and that New York was a proper and convenient forum in which to
litigate.98 The court emphasized that there was no other forum
available in which to bring the suit. 99 Furthermore, after considering the relative inconvenience to all parties in regard to costs, ease
of proof, and availability of witnesses, the court determined that
the scale of equities for retaining jurisdiction tipped to the side of
the plaintiffs. 10 0

sued Gulf Oil Corp. for its alleged negligence in causing the destruction of his warehouse in
Virginia. The only connection with New York was that Gulf was qualified to do business
here. Because it appeared that every witness was located in Virginia and that the action was
only brought in New York because New York juries generally awarded greater damages, the
action was dismissed. Id. at 509-12.
"' Silver v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 29 N.Y.2d 356, 361, 278 N.E.2d 619, 622, 328 N.Y.S.2d
398, 402 (1972).
96 84 Misc. 2d 547, 378 N.Y.S.2d 555 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1975).
97 Id. at 548-49, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 557.
181d. at 550, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 558.
99
Id. Due to timing and jurisdictional problems in other states, a finding that New York
had no jurisdiction over the claims or that this State was an inconvenient forum for their
assertion would have, in the opinion of the court, denied the plaintiffs a remedy in any
forum since the statute of limitations had already run in Alabama and Seider-type jurisdiction had already been rejected in Rhode Island. The Menefee court did not discuss the
possibility of requiring the defendant to waive the statute of limitations, or to agree to accept
service of process in another forum in exchange for a dismissal on forum non conveniens
grounds. Such conditional dismissals are common. See Irrigation & Indus. Dev. Corp. v.
Indag, S.A., 44 App. Div. 2d 543, 353 N.Y.S.2d 471 (1st Dep't 1974) (mem.), aff'd, 37
N.Y.2d 522, 337 N.E.2d 749, 375 N.Y.S.2d 296 (1975); Ginsburgh v. Hearst Publishing Co.,
5 App. Div. 2d 200, 170 N.Y.S.2d 691 (1st Dep't 1958), aff'd, 5 N.Y.2d 894, 156 N.E.2d 708,
183 N.Y.S.2d 77 (1959); Sutton v. Garcia, 80 Misc. 2d 690, 363 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1974).
100 84 Misc. 2d at 551, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 558-59. Although the defendant might have had
to transport witnesses from Alabama to testify on the issue of culpability, it is also true that
five sets of families from New York and Rhode Island would be needed to testify to elements
of damages for the plaintiffs. Additionally, plaintiffs intended calling witnesses from other
parts of the country.
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The court's holding appears contrary to the spirit of at least
one appellate division ruling, Vaage v. Lewis, 10 1 wherein the court
strictly construed the application of Seider jurisdiction. The Vaage
court dismissed the Seider-based claim of a Norwegian plaintiff
against a North Carolina defendant for injuries sustained in an
automobile accident in North Carolina. Judge Christ, speaking for
the court, concluded that bothforum non conveniens and due process
considerations mandated dismissal.10 2 The court found that there
was an insufficient nexus with New York to justify an exercise of
jurisdiction, since none of the parties were New York residents and
the accident itself had occurred out-of-state. 0 3 It should be noted,
however, that Menefee is not completely without precedent. In
McHugh v. Paley,10 4 for example, the court asserted jurisdiction
over both a resident and a nonresident defendant in a suit brought
by a nonresident plaintiff and based on a foreign tort. In so
holding, the court emphasized the fact that New York was the only
05
possible forum wherein the action could be brought.'
The doctrine offorum non conveniens is used only to dismiss a
case over which the court actually does have jurisdiction. Thus, in
the absence of a proper jurisdictional base, the doctrine need not
be considered. In Menefee and the related Seider-type cases, how101 29 App. Div. 2d 315, 288 N.Y.S.2d 521 (2d Dep't 1968), discussed in 7B McKINNEY'S
CPLR 5201, commentary at 42-43 (Supp. 1975).
102 29 App. Div. 2d at 318, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 524-25.
103 Judge Christ declared that an exercise of jurisdiction in this case would deprive the
defendants of "basic due process." Id. Moreover, the court indicated it is the public policy of
New York to deter the "influx here of unwanted and unnecessary lawsuits." Id. at 318, 288
N.Y.S.2d at 524 (citation omitted).
104 63 Misc. 2d 1092, 314 N.Y.S.2d 208 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1970), discussed in 7B
McKINNEY'S CPLR 5201, commentary at 20-21 (Supp. 1975).
105 Recognizing that Seider is not ordinarily available to one nonresident in an action
against another, the McHugh court emphasized that the nonresident defendant was an
employee of Paley, the resident defendant, was driving a car owned by Paley, and was a
crucial witness for the defense of Paley, who was already within the court's jurisdiction. 63
Misc. 2d at 1093, 1096-97, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 211, 214. It was considered more fair and
reasonable to assert jurisdiction over this nonresident due to the special circumstances
involved than it would be in the case of the ordinary nonresident. Although the precedential
value of the case is somewhat weakened by its partial dependence on the since overruled case
of De La Bouillerie v. De Vienne, 300 N.Y. 60, 89 N.E.2d 15 (1949), overruled, Silver v. Great
Am. Ins. Co., 29 N.Y.2d 356, 278 N.E.2d 619, 328 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1972), see note 109 infra,
the considerations of equity which were central to the McHugh court's holding remain. If the
plaintiff, a disabled welfare recipient in Massachusetts, had not been allowed to prosecute
her claim in New York, she would have been denied a remedy in any forum. 63 Misc. 2d at
1095, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 212. Readily distinguished from McHugh is Vath v. Israel, 80 Misc. 2d
759, 364 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1975), where the court dismissed a
multiple-plaintiff Seider action on other grounds, but in dicta stated that New York was an
inconvenient forum under CPLR 327 because the contacts with New York were too tenuous.
Only one of two plaintiffs was allegedly a New York resident, but even he had a New Jersey
driver's license.
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ever, this distinction seems to have been blurred. 10 6 Conceptually,
Seider jurisdiction is a form of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction with the
jurisdictional res being the insurance company's intangible obligation to defend and indemnify its insured. Given the res, such
factors as the plaintiff's residency, although relevant to forum non
conveniens, theoretically should not affect the existence of jurisdiction. But, because this obligation or debt exists in every state in
which the insurer does any business, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit has indicated that absent some other nexus with the
forum state, such as residency of the plaintiff, Seider jurisdiction
07
might very well be unconstitutional.1
It should be noted that the reasons advanced in Vaage for
denying jurisdiction over a nonresident's claim are not entirely
applicable to the multiple plaintiff situation. Refusing to assert
jurisdiction over nonresidents in such a case would not help to
deter the "influx here of unwanted and unnecessary lawsuits"'' 08
since a major portion of the action will probably be tried in New
York regardless of the disposition of the nonresident plaintiffs'
claims.' 0 9 In addition, it is difficult to see how entertainment of the
106Emphasis on fairness and equity has led to a tendency on the part of courts to
intermix discussion of minimum contacts/due process analysis with theforum non conveniens
doctrine. Morley, Forum Non Conveniens: Restraining Long-Arm Jurisdiction, 68 Nw. U.L.

REv. 24, 27-34 (1973). But it is clear that even where contacts exist between the forum and
the defendant which satisfy the minimum contacts test for jurisdiction, the forum may,
nevertheless, be inconvenient for purposes of trying the action. Kilpatrick v. Texas & P. Ry.,
166 F.2d 788, 790-91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 814 (1948); J.F. Pritchard & Co. v. Dow
Chem. of Canada, Ltd., 331 F. Supp. 1215, 1218-19 (W.D. Mo. 1971), aff'd, 462 F.2d 998
(8th Cir. 1972).
107 Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 812 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 840
(1969). In Farrell, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a Seider attachment
brought by nonresidents could not confer jurisdiction on the court because the action did
not have sufficient contacts with New York, and that this result could not be circumvented by
the appointment of a New Yorker to act as administrator of the nonresident plaintiffs'
estates.
In Varady v. Margolis, 303 F. Supp. 23 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), discussed in 7B MCKINNEY'S
CPLR 5201, commentary at 32-33 (Supp. 1975), the district court chose to split the litigation
arising out of a Seider attachment because two of the five plaintiffs injured in the accident
were not residents of New York. Strictly construing prior cases which stressed the importance of residency as a crucial factor in Seider's constitutionality, the court determined that
the claims of the nonresident plaintiffs were separate and independent from those of the
New York residents. The nonresidents, therefore, could not make use of the Seider procedure to gain quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over the defendants. 303 F. Supp. at 25-26. None of
the cases relied upon therein dealt with the multiple plaintiff problem which was present in
Varady
108 or Menefee.
See note 103 supra.

109
As the Menefee court stated, "[tihe same accident is involved and there is no indication that a heavy burden will be imposed upon the court in permitting these nonresident
decedents' causes of action to be adjudicated in tandem with the resident decedents' cases."
84 Misc. 2d at 550, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 558. Prior to 1972, the Menefee court would have been
unable to dismiss the New York resident's claims since it was the policy of New York courts
to refuse to invoke the doctrine offorum non conveniens whenever either party was a New

796
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nonresidents' claims would be a deprivation of the defendant's due
process rights if the defendant and his insurer are already defending against the resident-plaintiffs' claims. The exercise of jurisdiction in such cases will both save all parties' time and money as well
as benefit the public interest by avoiding multiplicity of suits. 1 0
An additional argument, although not discussed by the Menefee
court, supports the court's jurisdictional acceptance of the plaintiffs' claims. By following Menefee, New York will obviate the possibility of resident-plaintiffs obtaining a priority on limited insurance
proceeds at the expense of nonresidents injured in the same accident. l ' Condoning such a priority would clearly be unpalatable as
a matter of equity and fairness.
The Menefee decision amply demonstrates that the Seider doctrine is workable in complex, multiparty factual situations. It also
indicates that remedies other than removal to federal court followed by a change of venue will be available to a seriously inconvenienced defendant. 1 2 Even more importantly, Menefee warns the
practitioner that rote application of Seider procedure will not assure
him a welcome mat in the forum of his choice. In the future,
York resident. De La Bouillerie v. De Vienne, 300 N.Y. 60, 62, 89 N.E.2d 15, 15-16 (1949).
This rule was abrogated in Silver v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 29 N.Y.2d 356, 278 N.E.2d 619, 328
N.Y.S.2d 398 (1972), wherein the Court of Appeals declared that mere residence is not the
controlling factor, and that invocation of theforum non conveniens doctrine should turn on
"considerations of justice, fairness and convenience." Id. at 361, 278 N.E.2d at 622, 328
N.Y.S.2d at 402. Shortly thereafter, rule 327 was proposed and added to the CPLR.
EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE N.Y. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE A60 (1973). CPLR 327
provides:
When the court finds that in the interest of substantial justice the action should be
heard in another forum, the court, on the motion of any party, may stay or dismiss
the action in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just. The domicile or
residence in this state of any party to the action shall not preclude the court from staying or
dismissing the action.
(emphasis added). Despite this new rule, the Menefee court was still convinced, with good
cause, that New York was a more convenient forum, given the great number of witnesses
that resided in, or near, New York. 84 Misc. 2d at 550-51, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 558-59.
'"'See 84 Misc. 2d at 550, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 558.
...This possible problem was discussed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
in Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 117, 119 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844
(1969), and by Professor Siegel in a series of articles on Seider written for the New York Law
Journal. See, Siegel, Seider v. Roth: U.S. Courts Faced with Special Problems, 161 N.Y.L.J. 50,
Mar. 13, 1969, at 5, col. 3.
112 Federal procedure permits any defendant to remove an action from a state court to
the federal district court where the action is pending if the federal court would have had
original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970). Since the parties in a Seider action often satisfy
diversity of citizenship requirements contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970) this procedure
may be available. Thereafter, "for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it
might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1970). Thus in a diversity of citizenship action,
the suit might be transferred to the defendant's district. See, e.g., Leinberger v. Webster, 66
F.R.D. 28 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). Since New York now has a more flexibleforum non conveniens
rule, the federal courts will be less likely to transfer a case, owing to comity, once a New York
court has refused to dismiss it. See 1 WK&M $ 327.03.
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complaining and defending attorneys would be well advised to
prepare strongly developed allegations concerningforum non conveniens as well as jurisdictional contacts in framing their pleadings.
ARTICLE 75 -

ARBITRATION

CPLR 7502(b): Contract statute of limitations applied to demand for
arbitration.

CPLR 7502(b) permits the statute of limitations to be asserted
as a defense to a demand for arbitration when the defense would
have barred an action on the underlying claim had it been commenced in a state court. 1 3 The defense must be asserted promptly
after receipt of a demand for arbitration, for failure to act quickly
may result in a waiver of the defense. 1 4 Although the procedure
for asserting the time-bar defense is well established, the criteria
for determining the statute of limitations applicable to an arbitration proceeding have been less clearly delineated." 5 Recently, in
Paver & Wildfoerster v. Catholic High School Association,16 the Court

of Appeals held that arbitration will be time barred only if on no
view of the facts could the claim withstand a time-bar challenge in
117
an action at law.
In Paver, the appellant-architects designed and supervised the
construction of the respondent school association's high school.
The contract contained a broad arbitration clause which referred
all future disputes arising under the contract to arbitration. When
the building began to leak, the school association demanded arbi113 CPLR

7502(b) provides in pertinent part:
If, at the time that a demand for arbitration was made or a notice of intention to
arbitrate was served, the claim sought to be arbitrated would have been barred by
limitation of time had it been asserted in a court of the state, a party may assert the
limitation as a bar to the arbitration ....

Where compliance with time limitations is a condition precedent to arbitration, the timeliness
of a demand for arbitration will be determined by the court. See Board of Educ. v. Heckler
Elec. Co., 7 N.Y.2d 476, 481-82, 166 N.E.2d 666, 668-69, 199 N.Y.S.2d 649, 652-53 (1960).
114 Service of a demand for arbitration or notice of intention to arbitrate is a common
procedure for the commencement of arbitration proceedings. The demand or notice usually
contains the 20-day preclusion caveat specified in CPLR 7503(c). Failure to move to stay the
arbitration within the allotted 20 days or participation in the arbitration proceedings waives
the defense that ".... a valid agreement was not made or has not been complied with and...
[also waives] the bar of a limitation of time ...." CPLR 7 503(c).
I's Compare Naetzker v. Brocton Cent. School Dist., 50 App. Div. 2d 142, 376 N.Y.S.2d
300 (4th Dep't 1975) (applied tort limitation period in barring arbitration of a claim for
architect's malpractice), with In re Three Sofia Bros., 190 Misc. 891, 76 N.Y.S.2d 237 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1947) (applied contract statute of limitations although damagie was caused by
negligence).
11638 N.Y.2d 669, 345 N.E.2d 565, 382 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976). Chief Judge Breitel
authored
the majority opinion.
117
Id. at 677-78, 345 N.E.2d at 570, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 26-27.

